

SECURITY INFORMATION

SUBJECT: SE-44: THE SOVIET STATEMENT OF 25 APRIL 1953 IN REPLY TO
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S SPEECH OF 16 APRIL 1953

DOCUMENT NO. *SE-44*
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
☒ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
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AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 3 FEB '81 REVIEWER: 018557

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the significance of the Soviet statement of 25 April 1953.

1. The Soviet statement of 25 April 1953 is a reasoned defense of Soviet policy and of the World Communist movement. The language is relatively temperate, but there is no indication that the rulers of the USSR will modify their stand on any of the issues outstanding between East and West.

2. The printing of the full text of President Eisenhower's speech is an unusual but not unprecedented act. The Soviet press has occasionally printed the speeches and writings of "capitalist" statesmen when such action could serve as the basis for a reply. In this case, one motive for printing may have been the conviction that the speech could be represented to the Soviet people as a demand for the surrender by the USSR of the gains of World War II and of Communist principles as the price of peace. Probably also the Soviet rulers hoped by this action to convince world opinion of the sincerity of current Soviet "peace" tactics.

3. While Soviet and world Communist policies and actions are consistently defended as serving peace and justice, there is a distinction drawn between territories now in the Bloc, which are not subject to discussion, and other areas such as Southeast Asia, Korea, Germany, and Austria. In the latter areas, as well as on subjects such as East-West trade and dis-

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armament, the statement intimates that there is room for discussion. However, in each case the rectitude of past Soviet positions is affirmed, with the suggestion that it is up to the US to make specific proposals for a settlement.

4. The total impression left by the statement is that it is a skillful effort to promote dissension within the US government, between the US government and the American people, and above all between the US and the rest of the non-Communist world. The statement suggests that the rulers of the USSR envisage a prolonged political warfare campaign exploiting the "peace" theme; that, ~~what~~ whatever their differing views on internal politics, they are united on questions of foreign policy. The statement gives no indication that they are prepared to make substantial concessions.

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Subject: SE-44 : The Soviet Statement of 25 April 1953,
in Reply to President Eisenhower's Speech of
16 April 1953.

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1. The Pravda editorial is a reasoned defense of Soviet policy and of the World Communist movement. The language is temperate, but there is no indication of willingness to make substantial concessions to achieve a relaxation of tensions. The reprinting of President Eisenhower's speech is an unusual but not unprecedented act. In the past, the Soviet press has reprinted the speeches and writings of "capitalist" statesmen when this action could serve as the basis for a reply. In this case, the motive for re-printing was apparently the conviction that the speech could be represented to the Soviet people as a demand for the unconditional surrender of the USSR.

2. While Soviet and world Communist policies and actions are consistently defended as serving peace, justice, and the interests of the common man against capitalist exploiters, there is a distinction drawn between territories now in the

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Blow, which are not subject to discussion, and other areas such as Southeast Asia, Korea, Germany, and Austria. In the latter areas, the editorial intimates that there is room for discussion. However, in each case the restitute of Soviet policy is affirmed, with the suggestion that it is up to the US to make specific proposals - publicly or privately - for a settlement.

3. The total impression left by the editorial is that it is a skillful effort to promote dissention within the US government, between the US government and the American people, and between the US and the rest of the non-Communist world. The editorial suggests that the rulers of the USSR intend to embark on a prolonged political warfare campaign, that their rulers, whatever their differing views on internal politics are united on questions of foreign policy, and that they are not prepared to make substantial concessions.